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In re Parental Rights as to M.F., 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 19 (Mar. 31, 2016)1
FAMILY LAW: TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS
Summary
The Court held that neither the United States Constitution nor the Nevada Constitution
guarantees the right to a trial by jury in a termination of parental rights proceeding. The Court also
concluded that the district court relied on substantial evidence in terminating appellant Jesus F.’s
parental rights.
Background
In January 2010, the Washoe County Department of Social Services (WCDSS) removed
Jesus F.’s six children from his home due to drug use, safety hazards, and inadequate supervision.
All six children were placed in protective custody, and resided in various out of home placements
over the next four years. By the time the three older children reached the age of majority, WCDSS
filed a petition to terminate Jesus F.’s parental rights as to the three minor children.
Jesus F. demanded a jury trial, but the district court issued an ordered denying his demand.
The district court concluded that the right to a jury trial in parental termination proceedings is not
guaranteed by common law, statute, nor the Nevada Constitution. After the Court conducted a
bench trial, it terminated Jesus F.’s parental rights as to the three minor children.
Jesus F. then appealed arguing that the district court erred in (1) denying his demand for a
jury trial in the termination of parental rights proceeding, (2) concluding that it was in the minor
children’s best interests to terminate Jesus F.’s parental rights pursuant to NRS 128.109(2), and
(3) concluding that Jesus F.’s parental fault had been established pursuant to NRS 128.105(2).
Discussion
The district court did not err in denying Jesus F.’s demand for a jury trial in the termination of
parental rights proceeding
Constitutional issues, such as the right to a jury trial, are reviewed de novo.2 Upon a de
novo review, the Court concluded that neither the United States Constitution nor the Nevada
Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in termination of parental rights proceedings.
The United States Constitution does not guarantee the right to a jury trial in a termination of
parental rights proceeding
The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right to a civil
jury trial, however, that Amendment does not apply to the states.3 The United States Supreme
Court has held that states cannot terminate parental rights without due process of law because “the
companionship, care, custody, and management of [one’s] children” is an important interest that
1

By Shannon Diaz.
Awada v. Shuffle Master, Inc., 123 Nev. 613, 618, 173 P.3d 707, 711 (2007).
3
See Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 216 (1917); See also Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241
U.S. 211, 217 (1916).
2

“warrants protection,”4 but the Court has not addressed whether due process requires a jury trial
for a termination of parental rights proceeding. Yet because parents retain a vital interest in
preventing destruction of their family life, due process requires states to provide parents with
fundamentally fair procedures in parental termination proceedings.5
The United States Supreme Court has formulated a balancing test to evaluate whether a
proceeding violates a parent’s due process rights. The Mathews test requires a Court to balance (1)
the private interest affected by the proceeding, (2) the risk or error inherent in the state’s
procedures, and (3) the countervailing government interest. 6 While a parent’s interest is a
“commanding one,”7 a state also retains an interest in promoting the child’s welfare, and an
administrative interest in reducing the cost and burdens of a termination proceeding. 8 Moreover,
the Court has refused to guarantee the right to counsel in a termination proceeding because the
parent does not risk personal liberty.9
The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that because Jesus F. does not risk a loss of personal
liberty, the Court must apply the Mathews test. Jesus F.’s interest in the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his three minor children must be weighed against the state’s interest
in the welfare of the children, conservation of judicial resources, and the need for an accurate and
fair outcome. The Court concluded that because both parties have compelling interests, the analysis
turns on an evaluation of the risk that the procedures used would have resulted in an erroneous
decision.
The decision to hold a bench trial as opposed to a jury trial posed only a minimal risk of an
erroneous decision. First, a jury is not a required component of fact finding,10 and the family court
judge demonstrated familiarity with the rules of evidence, the legal standards of a termination
action, and the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure. The court also applied the heightened clear and
convincing standard. Second, Jesus F. was given notice of the proceeding, afforded competent
counsel to protect his interest, and was afford the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him.11 Third, Jesus F. retained the right to appeal from the adverse decision.
Thus, the district court did not violate Jesus F.’s due process rights pursuant to the U.S.
Constitution.
The Nevada Constitution does not guarantee the right to a jury trial in a termination of parental
rights proceeding
The Nevada Constitution guarantees that the right to a trial by jury “shall be secured to all
and remain inviolate forever.”12 The phrase “remain inviolate forever” indicates an intent to
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perpetuate the jury trial right as the framers understood it when the Constitution was adopted.13
No action existed for termination of parental rights when the Constitution was adopted, and the
Legislature has not conferred the right to a jury trial in such proceedings, thus, the Nevada
Constitution does not guarantee a jury trial in a termination of parental rights proceeding.
Moreover, requiring jury trials in the district court’s family division implicates many policy
concerns. First, it would institute a delay and would slow the pace of the high volume cases before
the family court, which would create a backlog where speedy resolution is important. Second, it
may undermine the interest of maintaining a child’s anonymity. Third, many family courts in
Nevada are not equipped to accommodate jurors. Finally, a jury may not necessarily render a
decision more reliable than a family court judge.14 This is consistent with the national trend to
deny jury trials in termination of parental rights proceedings.
The district court relied on substantial evidence in its decision to terminate Jesus F.’s parental
rights
Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable person would accept as adequate to sustain
a judgment.15 To terminate parental rights, a petitioner must demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that (1) at least one ground of parental fault exists, and (2) termination is in the child’s
best interest.16 The primary consideration being the best interest of the child.17 The following
presumptions exist for a child who have resided outside of the home for 14 of any 20 consecutive
months: (1) a court must presume that the parent has made only token efforts to care for the child,
and (2) the best interest of the child must be presumed to be served by the termination of parental
rights.18 A parent may rebut these presumptions by a preponderance of evidence.19
Here, substantial evidence supports the district court’s findings that termination of Jesus
F.’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children, and that Jesus F. failed to rebut the
presumption due to his failure to show that there was a reasonable prospect that he could provide
for the children’s basic needs within a reasonable period of time.20 Second, substantial evidence
supports the district court’s findings as to five separate grounds of parental fault of Jesus F.’s
behalf. Thus, termination Jesus F,’s parental rights was supported by substantial evidence.
Conclusion
The district court properly denied Jesus F.’s demand for a jury trial in the termination of
parental rights proceeding. Further, substantial evidence supports the district court’s decision to
terminate Jesus F.’s parental rights. The Court affirmed the district court’s order.
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